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negotiate trade agreements is a little like
using the Third Fleet to achieve adjustments to NAFTA. Frankly, that is exactly
what French sees as the future role of the
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN),
once the PLAN’s growing size helps to
reduce U.S. influence in China’s sphere.
French’s most significant observation—
unique among similar books—is that the
American-centric nature of most assessments of the PRC’s rise blinds us to the
fact that most Chinese do not regard the
United States as its primary, long-term
enemy. Rather, Japan is perceived as the
once-and-future foe that deserves the
most retribution for China’s “century
of humiliation.” French illustrates the
popularity of this mainland view by
examining the composition of the PRC’s
entertainment media. “[T]o turn on
the television in China is to be inundated with war themed movies, which
overwhelmingly focus on Japanese
villainy. More than two hundred
anti-Japanese films were produced in
2012 alone, with one scholar estimating
that 70 percent of Chinese TV dramas
involve Japan-related war plots” (p. 21).
Thus, in French’s estimate, it would not
be tension over islands (some of them
false) in the South China Sea that would
result in inadvertent war, but rather an
escalating dispute over the Senkakus.
French has done an excellent job of identifying the ties between dynastic China’s
open tian xia policies and PRC president
Xi Jinping’s aspirations for the future.
French points out the ironic similarities
between Xi’s rhetoric and that of the
Chinese communists’ greatest enemy,
Chiang Kai-shek, over the rightful dominance of China in Asia. Their desired
rules for international politics resemble
those represented in Thucydides’s
Melian Dialogue. French recounts that
when a Singaporean deputy expressed
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support for a maritime code of conduct
at a recent multilateral conference,
Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi
responded, “China is a big country and
other countries are small countries
. . . and that’s just a fact” (p. 126).
Everything under the Heavens is both
an informative book and an enjoyable
read. One hopes it will make the overly
optimistic think a little bit harder about
future relations between China and the
rest of the world. However, in the end,
French—whether by personal nature or
intellectual predilection—feels compelled to offer only optimistic recommendations. “A China that is treated
as an equal with much to contribute to
human betterment,” he writes, “but met
with understated but resolute firmness
when need be, is a China that will
mellow as it advances in the decades
ahead, and then most likely plateau”
(p. 284). Of course, how to be both
understated and resolute in an increasingly shrill world is the unanswered
dilemma. The problem with hugging
(or scolding) the panda is that it bites.
SAM J. TANGREDI

Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in
Norway, 1940, by John Kiszely. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2017. 390 pages. $44.99.

Anatomy of a Campaign by John
Kiszely provides an excellent historical
review of the military campaigns in
Norway in 1940. In his book, Kiszely
takes the reader on an exciting journey
following the British expeditionary
military campaign in Norway. He
asks for and investigates the reason
behind the failure. Was it poor military
performance, lack of intelligence, or just
poor strategy and decision-making?
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This journey takes the reader beyond the
obvious historical causes and looks at
the underlying reasons for the blunders
in operational and strategic decisionmaking. Compared with other books
written about the German and British
campaigns in Norway, this dissection
of the “anatomy” of a campaign is more
applicable to military campaigns today.
Kiszely looks into the structural
functions of the campaign and how they
related to each other to find out what
did and did not work. Since the military
campaign links the political objective to
military ways and means, he claims the
outcome of the campaign was a given—
even before the first shot. The book is
valuable because the lessons from the
Norwegian campaign demonstrate the
relations between strategy and policy
and the effect on the operational and
tactical levels. Modern campaigns build
on experience from the past, and readers
will appreciate this honest dissection as
the author shares his own insight from
joint strategic military and operational
experience. Kiszely is a retired, highly
decorated British officer and a soldier
with operational command experience
in national and international operations,
as well as service on the Joint Staff.
The author examines the challenges
that Great Britain faced in the transition
from peace to war. How does a country
move from a peacetime organization and
optimize the ways and means to achieve
strategic ends? His insight into British
decision-making and the relationship
between military leaders and their
political masters is an outstanding assessment of a strategy-policy mismatch
and shows how a service-oriented
approach to a military campaign utterly
fails. Modern, theater-level campaigns
are orchestrated at the operational level
to synchronize joint-service contributions. Kiszely claims that unique,
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British, service-oriented leadership
contributed to a disconnect between
strategic- and tactical-level objectives.
British military culture at that time was
founded on superior improvisation and
ad hoc adaptation. Services conducted
separate operations driven by German
military initiatives, and those operations
sometimes were counterproductive
to the theater campaign. Today’s
commanders should not overlook the
lessons that his insight provides.
The author makes a convincing argument that understanding expeditionary
operations and campaigns is vital to
managing the strategic and grand
strategic environments. On the grand
strategic level, the British struggled to
formulate common political objectives
with its allies, which had a direct
effect on the conduct of the campaign.
Domestic politics influenced the
national decision-making, and the need
to do something haunted the Allied
coalition. Even as the security situation
obviously required the Allies to build
up forces on the continent to meet
the threat from Germany, forces were
diverted to a secondary front in Norway,
for which they were not prepared.
Those directing multinational
operations need to consider how to
build political and military unity into
a campaign. According to Kiszely, the
Allies and Germany approached strategy
and policy very differently because of
their opposing political orientations: a
democratic coalition on the one hand
and an authoritarian regime on the
other. The German decision-making
in this phase of the war had strategic
advantages, as its policy and campaign
plans were synchronized, whereas the
Allied coalition was not able to adapt
to the operational tempo and unite
around a coherent grand strategy.
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Kiszely provides a convincing argument
that the foundation for German success
was theater-level strategy and management of the campaign. Even though the
Allies had local successes, as demonstrated in the battle of Narvik, their
tactical achievements were not embedded in a grand strategy or theater-level
objective for winning the campaign.
In conclusion, Kiszely claims that the
campaign in Norway was a decisive
victory for the Germans, in that they
achieved strategic surprise and dominating airpower. The main reason for the
British campaign failure is found in
the link between policy and plans. The
ends were not supported by available
means and ways, and policy became
divorced from reality. Such determinations leave the reader to evaluate and
decide where the responsibility for
the failure of the campaign lies.
The book summarizes key military
lessons learned and strategic guidance.
I strongly encourage national security
advisers and military leaders to read it.
LARS SAUNES

The Cold War: A World History, by Odd Arne
Westad. New York: Basic Books, 2017. 720 pages.
$40.

Odd Arne Westad has taken on a
difficult task: providing a one-volume
history of the Cold War. The U.S.-Soviet
confrontation lasted over four decades
and had many episodes. Cramming the
entire story into one book—even one
that is over seven hundred pages long—
is no simple thing. Westad made his task
even harder by taking an international
focus and starting his coverage in the
1890s, with the politicization of the
confrontation between labor and capital.
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However, Westad is certainly up to the
task. He is something of a transnational
man. Although Norwegian, he holds a
PhD from a U.S. school (the University
of North Carolina) and has taught in
both the United Kingdom and the
United States. This book is the product
of research in archives around the planet
(Bulgaria, Egypt, India, Russia, South
Africa, and the United States) and the
reading of other source material published in German, French, Chinese, and
Norwegian. An important advantage to
this book is that it is an easy read, which
is crucial, given its length. It is easy for
historians to get trapped in the details of
their research and skimp on their analysis and writing. That is not the case here.
Westad covers events in a compelling
but concise manner. At times, though,
the reader might wish that he had
provided more documentation of his
arguments, since his footnotes often do
not show from where his evidence came.
The chapter on the ideological elements
of the confrontation before the 1940s
is less than convincing, but fortunately
short. Westad sustains these arguments
better in the body of the text. In World
War II, capitalism and communism
worked together not because of the Nazi
threat but only because of the Germans.
“Some form of postwar conflict was
next to inevitable” (p. 68). Joseph Stalin
was a brutal dictator, but he also was
indecisive and let European affairs
drift, while the United States acted. As a
result, Washington had more to do with
turning the postwar confrontation into
a sustained Cold War than did Moscow.
One of the central arguments of this
book is that the Cold War was about
more than the United States and the
Soviet Union. On this point, Westad is
certainly correct; the question is one
of emphasis. He gives a good deal of
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